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Clarion Call or False Alarm: Why Proposed 

Exemptions to Equal Marriage Statutes Return 

Us to a Religious Understanding of the Public 

Marketplace
 
Taylor Flynn
 
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1 When I was invited to participate in this symposium, its topic—whether there
should be religious exemptions to equal marriage statutes—initially struck me as a 
concession by religious objectors to same-sex marriage indicating that the gay rights 
battleground had shifted.  Proponents proffer the exemptions as a compromise to protect 
religious liberty when equal marriage rights are achieved via popular support.
1 
Closer
examination, though, suggested that I should not be so sanguine about the compromise
the exemptions purport to represent. 
¶2 There are only a handful of states in which enactment of equal marriage statutes is
possible in the foreseeable future,
2 
yet the attention given to this topic has been 
widespread.
3 
Of course, objectors validly can be concerned about what they view as an 

Taylor Flynn, Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. I am grateful for the 
comments of participants at the Workshop on Regulating Family, Sex, and Gender at the University of
Chicago School of Law in response to an earlier version of this piece, and in particular would like to thank
Mary Anne Case and Adam Samaha for their insights and suggestions.
1 
See, e.g., Marc Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL‘Y 307, 307–8
(2010); see also Letter from Thomas C. Berg, Carl H. Esbeck, Robin Fretwell Wilson, & Richard W.
Garnett to Christopher G. Donovan, Speaker of the Conn. House, on Religious Liberty Implications of
Raised Bill 899 (Apr. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Religious Liberty Letter], available at
http://www.nationformarriage.org/atf/cf/%7B39D8B5C1-F9FE-48C0-ABE6­
1029BA77854C%7D/Berg.etal.pdf.  Equal marriage rights have been achieved via statute, without the 
capacious exemptions proposed by exemption advocates, in New Hampshire and Vermont. See
DOMAWatch.org, http://www.domawatch.org/stateissues/index.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
2 
More than forty states and the federal government have either a statutory or constitutional provision
prohibiting same-sex marriage. See DOMAWatch.org, supra note 1. Of those remaining, five states
guarantee equal marriage. Id. 
3 
This includes a book of collected works on the subject, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008)
[hereinafter SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY], as well as recent events at high profile 
institutions nationwide, including: Harvard Law School, see Lambda at Harvard Law School, News
Update, http://harvardlambda.org/2010/03/news-update-329/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2010); UCLA School of
Law, see The Williams Institute, 2009–2010 Events,
http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/programs/2009-10Events.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2010); the 
Brookings Institute, see The Brookings Institute, Same Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty: A
Reconciliation, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2009/0313_marriage.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2010); 
and the Journal of Law and Social Policy’s 2009 Symposium, ―Same-Sex Marriage and Religious 
Accommodation: Determining the Role of the Legislature.‖ See also Peter Steinfels, Will Same-Sex
Marriage Collide with Religious Liberty?, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2006, at A11 (discussing the December
2005 conference at Becket Fund for Religious Liberty). 
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infringement on religious liberty, even if only possible in a few states.  When I read the
proposed exemption language, however, it became immediately clear that the proposal‘s 
reach is far more expansive than its proponents acknowledge.  With one notable
difference,
4 
the proposed language for religious exemptions has been remarkably
consistent.  Edited here to demonstrate its outer reaches, the proposed statutory language
is commonly the following: ―No individual . . . shall be liable, penalized, or denied 
benefits under the laws of this state or any subdivision . . . including but not limited to 
laws regarding employment discrimination, housing, public accommodations, licensing, 
government contracts or grants, or tax exempt status, for refusing to provide services . . . 
related to the solemnization of any marriage . . . or for refusing to treat as valid any
marriage, where such providing . . . or treating as valid would cause such individuals . . .
to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.‖
5 
¶3 The proposed exemptions alarm me, not simply as a defender and beneficiary of 
same-sex marriage, but as someone who cares deeply about discrimination, including
discrimination based on religious belief.  Even proponents‘ framing of the issue is 
problematic.  While there are conflicts between religious objectors and antidiscrimination 
laws, exemption proponents often present the issue in terms such as ―Gay Rights versus 
Religious Freedom.‖
6 
A fair implication of this rubric is that religion and same-sex
orientation are somehow mutually exclusive.  This common presentation of the issue 
ignores that many religious faiths support same-sex marriage as a matter of theology, that 
many gay people are members of religious faiths, and that many of us are strong
supporters of religious liberty.
¶4 The proposed language is frequently presented as a modest compromise to protect 
religious liberty.
7 
To the contrary, the statutory language operates by effectively
eviscerating existing sexual orientation protections.  In addition, while the exemptions‘
greatest impact may be on laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, the 
exemptions similarly threaten state and local civil rights protections for classifications 
including race, sex, and even religion itself.  The exemptions permit sincerely-held 
religious objections regardless of the class protected: by its terms, a Muslim florist could 
refuse to sell flowers to participants in a Jewish wedding; a caterer could refuse to 
provide services because the cleric officiating is a woman; a landlord could refuse to rent 
to a married couple who is inter-racial or interfaith.  
4 
In a distinction that is arguably telling, the primary difference between academic and political proposals is
that the former often includes a so-called ―substantial hardship exception‖ to protect the rights of same-sex
couples in limited circumstances, while language proposed in the political arena at times does not. 
Compare Stern, supra note 1, at 307–8 (discussing a substantial hardship exception), with Religious Liberty
Letter, supra note 1, at 7–8 (lacking a discussion of a substantial hardship exception). The hardship
exception is narrow, providing an exemption where ―a party to the marriage is unable to obtain any similar
services . . . elsewhere and . . . such inability . . . constitute a substantial hardship‖ and that ―no government 
official may refuse to solemnize a marriage if another government official is unable or unwilling to do so. 
Stern, supra note 1, at 307–8.
5 
Stern, supra note 1, at 307.
6 
George W. Dent, Jr., Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights versus Religious Freedom, 95 KY. L.J. 553, 555
(2006–07).
7 
See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case For Government Official Exemptions, 
5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL‘Y 318 (arguing that permitting government officials to refuse to fulfill duties for
same-sex couples seeking marriage places an insubstantial burden on these couples where access to
marriage is not blocked).
237
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¶5 Public accommodations laws, including those prohibiting discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, impose costs on religious liberty.  Religious objections to 
homosexuality are deeply meaningful to many; I do not doubt the sincerity of those
beliefs.  The long-delayed recognition of equal marriage rights likewise has imposed and 
continues to impose costs on same-sex couples (such as those upon the couples and 
families denied protection, as well as the social cost of denied equality).  A state‘s 
eventual extension of equal rights, particularly when combined with the fundamental 
nature of marriage, is bound to conflict with the religious beliefs of objectors.  
¶6 Law is a balancing of interests.  ―Equality,‖ tout court, does not resolve the conflict 
between religious objections and compliance with antidiscrimination laws, nor does 
injury to one‘s religious beliefs. In fact, a balance of these competing interests has 
largely been struck: a plethora of exemptions for religious belief are already in place, 
undermining the claim that such capacious exclusions are warranted.
8 
For centuries, in a 
practice that continues into the present, religious freedom typically cedes to equality in 
the public realm, particularly with respect to commerce: the common law, which is the
precursor to public accommodations statutes, has required common carriers to serve all
who seek their services on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, despite claimed 
infringements on the seller‘s liberty.
9 
¶7 There is a reason those engaging in commerce generally are not permitted to 
choose whom to serve, even when service may conflict with the seller‘s religious beliefs; 
its locus is the intersection of equality and civil society. The imposition of a duty to serve
all comers reflects the common law‘s determination that in a clash between a seller‘s 
asserted rights or beliefs and her provision of services to a willing buyer, the burden 
should fall on the seller who has placed herself in the public marketplace for commercial 
gain.  As the Supreme Court of Mississippi recognized as early as 1873, ―[a]mong those 
customs which we call the common law, that have come down to us from the remote past, 
are rules which have a special application to those who sustain a quasi public relation to 
the community.‖
10 
¶8 While exemption advocates proffer the exemptions in the name of balance, their 
scope and breadth is unprecedented.  Although framed in terms of marriage and sexual 
orientation, the exemptions‘ reach extends far beyond both: they excuse compliance from
fair housing laws, healthcare, education, adoption, employment, government contracts,
8 
For example, federal antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
 
2000e (2006), provide protection for religious belief, and while the compelling interest test under the 

federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, was overturned in City of Boerne v.
 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), there is robust protection at the state level, with approximately one dozen
 
states protecting religious belief through the statutory enactment of state religious freedom restoration acts,
 
in addition to protection provided by some state constitutional amendments or state case law. See generally
 
Kelleen Patricia Forlizzi, State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts as a Solution to the Free Exercise 

Problem of Religiously Based Refusals to Administer Health Care, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 387 (2010); 

James W. Wright Jr., Making State Religious Freedom Restoration Amendments Effective, 61 ALA. L. REV. 

425 (2010). See also Home School Legal Defense Association, State Religious Freedom Acts: Frequently
 
Asked Questions, http://www.hslda.org/docs/nche/000000/00000083.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2010); 

Posting of Derek Gaubatz to The Mail Archive, http://www.mail­
archive.com/religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu/msg02033.html (Feb. 28, 2005, 9: 25 EST).

9 
A thorough review of the history of the common law‘s ―common carrier duty‖ as the predecessor to
	
public accommodations statutes, as well as its relationship to the enactment of the 13th–15th amendments
 
to the Constitution, may be found in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 289–309 (1964).
 
10 
Bell, 378 U.S. at 298 (quoting Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661, 680–81 (1873)).
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licensing, grants, tax-exempt status, and anywhere else that public accommodations laws 
apply.  In addition, they permit sincerely-held religious objections based on any protected 
classification, including race, sex, sexual orientation, and religion.  Individuals, in effect, 
would be required to conform their lives to others‘ religious beliefs as a condition of their 
equal participation in the marketplace.
¶9 Upon reflection, it is unsurprising that exemption advocates offer a proposal that 
facially applies to all protected classes, rather than urging a codified ―gay-exception‖ to 
equal marriage laws.  As a pragmatic matter, equal marriage statutes will be possible only
in a state in which citizens are supportive of gay rights: a suggestion by proponents to 
single out gay people for discrimination would likely be politically infeasible.  A ―gay ­
only‖ exemption, moreover, could strengthen a gay rights challenge on the ground that 
the exemption reflects animus.
11 
¶10 Given the unfortunate history of religious persecution, as well as American 
constitutional concern for preserving religious liberty, advocates‘ broad-based claim of 
religious injury has understandable resonance.  For proponents to present this as a claim 
that pits the need for religious protection against other statutorily protected statuses (such 
as race, sex, and sexual orientation) has undoubted purchase—often disparagingly
referred to as that of ―competing victimhoods.‖
12 
¶11 The phrase ―competing victimhoods‖ commonly is used depreciatingly to imply
competition among minority groups, in which each (as is frequently implied, perhaps 
unjustifiably) complains about (and again, as is frequently implied, perhaps magnifies) its 
injuries to receive a greater share of some perceived allotment of social goods (whether
material goods or for political or social gain).
13 
In short, the phrase conjures a negative
image of fighting among minority groups over their share of a presumed ―special rights‖ 
pie.
14 
Despite the phrase‘s derisive slant, it captures an important concept within social 
movements.  Identity-based groups, whether religious objectors to homosexuality or gay
rights advocates, typically view their identity as in some way inseverable from the
group‘s expression of dissent from majority norms—dissent that results in 
marginalization (or, more dismissively, ―victimization‖).
15 
11 
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking a state constitutional amendment prohibiting sexual 
orientation nondiscrimination protections on the ground, inter alia, that removing a vast array of
protections from a narrowly targeted, unpopular minority constituted an animus-based enactment in
violation of equal protection). As discussed infra at Part III, while the demarcation distinguishing animus
from permissible moral or religious belief is hotly contested, the imprimatur of the state in designating a 
vulnerable minority for disfavor by denying them widespread legal protection may be susceptible to a 
finding of animus.
12 
For uses of the term ―competing victimhoods‖ with respect to religious identity, see, for example, Jordan
Elgrably, In Your Faith: Many Jewish Gen Xers are Embracing their Religion and Cultural Icons with
Defiance and Bold Irony, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1996, at Life & Style 1 (―America has entered into an age 
of competing victimhoods. . . . The energy that used to go into trying to create a . . . more just society has 
been rerouted into competing claims of ethnic rights.‖); Jerrold M. Post, Israelis and Palestinians need
each other—as Enemies, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 30, 1993, at A23 (―[T]he Israeli-Palestinian struggle can be 
looked on as a struggle of competing victimhoods.‖).
13 
See, e.g., Elgrably, supra note 12, at Life & Style 1.
14 
Although he does not use the phrase ―competing victimhoods,‖ Justice Scalia‘s ―special rights‖ rhetoric 
exemplifies the underlying notion of a minority group seeking to exert assertedly disproportionate influence
to gain unwarranted social goods. Romer, 517 U.S. at 637–45 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing
antidiscrimination laws as, inter alia, ―special rights‖ and ―preferential treatment‖).
15 
See, e.g., Taylor Flynn, Instant (Gender) Messaging: Expression-Based Challenges to State Enforcement 
of Gender Norms, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 465, 475–90 (2009) (discussing non-conforming
239
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¶12 Religious objectors to homosexuality have as much right to claim marginalization 
as any other group: the ability of an identity-based group to express dissent is an essential 
component of democracy.
16 
My complaint is not with religious objectors‘ increasingly
high profile use of proclaimed marginalization,
17 
as it is an effective organizing tool for
social movements.  Instead, I argue that exemption proponents significantly overestimate
their asserted marginalization when the issue is same-sex marriage; I further argue that 
proponents significantly underestimate the likely damage to sexual orientation and other
antidiscrimination protections.  
¶13 Interestingly, even though the exemptions on their face apply to all protected 
classes, proponents discuss religious objections to homosexuality only.
18 
I tend to agree
that, as-applied, the exemptions are likely to primarily affect lesbians, bisexuals, and gay
men, denying us protection with respect to the multitude of public transactions that make
up day-to-day life.  Both outcomes, though (whether facial or as-applied) have the same 
underlying flaw: their impact is to return to a long-since rejected religious view of the
public marketplace, in which religion was a prevailing force behind the regulation of
commercial law.
19 
¶14 As applied to sexual orientation, I am particularly troubled by proponents‘ efforts 
to characterize discrimination against gay persons as less damaging than discrimination 
based on paradigmatic classifications such as race or sex.  Because many religious faiths 
teach that one should ―love the sinner but hate the sin,‖
20 
exemption proponents have
argued that such ―conduct‖-based discrimination creates no status-based harm to 
gender expression as dissent from majority norms); Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere:
Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1592 (2001) (describing ―expressive identity‖ claims as 
equality-based challenges in which one‘s identity and dissent from majoritarian norms cannot easily be 
separated from a message).
16 
See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Escaping the Expression-Equality Conundrum: Toward Anti-Orthodoxy and
Inclusion, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1671, 1720 (2000) (arguing that when a member of a marginalized group
asserts her right to be accepted within mainstream norms on an equal basis, that claim for equality is at 
once assimilative and an expression of dissent).
17 
Two decisions decided by the Supreme Court this past term concerned what could be characterized as 
claims of ―victimization‖ by religious objectors to homosexuality. See Christian Legal Soc‘y v. Martinez,
130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (rejecting the argument by Christian Legal Society that the law school‘s sexual 
orientation nondiscrimination policy singled out religious beliefs); Doe v. Reed, No. 09-559, 2010 WL
2518466 (June 24, 2010) (upholding as a facial matter disclosure requirements challenged by ―Protect 
Marriage Washington,‖ a sponsor of a referendum to stop implementation of state domestic partners law, in
which sponsor claimed threats and harassment if identities were disclosed). See also Maggie Gallagher,
Why Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL‘Y 260, 268
(2010) (asserting that equal marriage advocates in Maine ―went after the social work license of a high
school counselor after she appeared in a TV ad opposing same-sex marriage,‖ and stating that ―I never
expected to live in an America where individuals could be threatened with a loss of their livelihood for
expressing their position on marriage laws‖).
18 
The book of collected works on the subject, to which several participants of the Journal of Law and
Social Policy’s 2009 Symposium are contributors, solely addresses religious objections to same-sex
marriage. See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 3.
19 
See, e.g., Dennis J. Callahan, Medieval Church Norms and Fiduciary Duties in Partnership, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 215, 226 (2004) (noting that western commercial legal tradition originated during the 
th th
11 to the 13 centuries, when ―the Roman Catholic Church was the predominant generator and enforcer of
commercial law and the moral norms on which the pervasive regulation of the marketplace was based‖).
20 
As suggested by the following New York Times article, the duty to ―love the sinner but hate the sin‖ has
become socially recognized shorthand for religious objection to homosexual sexual conduct. See, e.g.,
Adam Nossiter, Hate the Sin, Love the Sinner; A Wheeler-Dealer Minister Denies Homophobia, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 1995, at B4.
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personhood, and instead merely constitutes insult.
21 
As an initial matter, proponents‘ 
argument ignores the myriad tangible goods that objectors may withhold, including
housing or equal pay for equal work (as when a married gay employee is denied spousal 
health coverage).  The law largely rejects the status-conduct distinction, and for good 
reason: a wide swath of discrimination (including that based on religion) would be 
exempt from liability under antidiscrimination laws, as conduct is frequently a proxy for
22 
status. 
¶15 To be candid, I find myself unnerved by proponents‘ failure to recognize the 
dignitary harm at the heart of public refusals to serve historically marginalized groups.  
Some advocates have gone so far as to suggest that, to alleviate the injury, business 
owners could post signs to warn gay persons that we may be refused service.  Even if 
phrased to avoid reference to a sexual orientation-based denial (for example, by limiting
services to ―traditional marriages‖ or framing the exemption as a refusal to facilitate 
same-sex sexual activity), the effect is a status-based harm: ―No gays served here.‖  Such
sign-posting is an embodiment of second-class citizenship; with the sanction of law, it
bestows upon individuals the right to determine whom they will serve in the public realm.                 
¶16 Exemption proponents assert that religious objections under their proposal will be 
relatively rare.
23 
I contend that objectors overstate support for same-sex marriage.  While
the exemptions presuppose sufficient support to enact an equal marriage statute, polls 
consistently show that support for same-sex marriage is the flashpoint in the gay rights 
debate.
24 
―While Americans have become increasingly likely to believe that the law 
should not discriminate against gay individuals and gay couples,‖ a Gallup poll
commentator recently stated, ―the public still seems reluctant at this point to extend those
protections to the institution of marriage.‖
25 
Indeed, not only has majority opposition to 
same-sex marriage continued unabated, opposition to same-sex marriage increased for
several years after equal marriage first became a reality in the United States, taking a few 
years to bounce back to the earlier level of support.
26 
A religious objector may or may
21 
See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay 
People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOKLYN L. REV. 125, 126, 137 (2006) (religious
objector‘s refusal to provide marriage-related services to gay persons is merely ―insult‖); see also
Gallagher, supra note 17, at 270, 271 (characterizing harm of proposed exemptions as gay persons‘
―knowledge of civil and moral disagreement with the choices one has made‖ and describing proposals as a
―critique‖).
22 
See generally infra Part III (B).
23 
See, e.g., Stern, supra note 1, at 308 (―[T]here are probably far fewer people around who would invoke 
such exemptions than is generally thought. And, given the poll data, there will be even fewer as older
people move off the commercial scene.‖); Koppelman, supra note 21, at 132–35 (asserting that gay persons
would rarely be refused services even under a broad exemption).
24 
As early as 2003, a Gallup poll showed that eighty-eight percent of Americans believed that gay people 
should have equal job opportunities. Lydia Saad, Gay Rights Attitudes a Mixed Bag: Broad Support for
Equal Job Rights, But Not for Gay Marriage, GALLUP, May 20, 2005,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/16402/gay-rights-attitudes-mixed-bag.aspx. In a 2009 Gallup poll, only forty
percent of Americans reported in favor of legalizing same-sex marriage, while nearly three in four
Americans, seventy-three percent, believe gay and lesbian domestic partners should have inheritance rights.
See Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority of Americans continue to Oppose Gay Marriage, GALLUP, May 27, 2009,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/118378/majority-americans-continue-oppose-gay-marriage.aspx (last visited
Sept. 9, 2010).
25 
Jones, supra note 24.
26 
―The Massachusetts ruling legalizing same-sex marriage, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440
Mass. 309 (2003), and the 2004 election campaign, coincided with a sharp, if relatively short term,
disruption of the previous slow but steady decade long shift of opinion . . . . Support returned to 2003
241
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not be a member of a religious minority; it is indisputable, however, that majority
opposition to equal marriage is the nationwide norm.                                                                          
¶17 I do not purport to account for the undoubtedly multi-faceted mix of components 
that form the basis for such heated opposition to same-sex marriage.  As others have
discussed, even an incomplete review of the anti-gay movement in the United States 
would suggest an amalgam that includes some amount of hostility, disgust, and fear of
the transmissibility of homosexual sex,
27 
combined with an anxiety or desire to protect 
what is believed to be the sanctity of heterosexual marriage.
28 
As William Eskridge has 
recounted, the contemporary anti-gay movement has its roots in the 1970s ―Save Our
Children campaign,‖ which he describes as at once ―aggressively negative, invoking
themes of disgust and contagion, as well as surprisingly positive . . . identity arrayed 
around marriage and family.‖
29 
Such disgust and fear of transmission operate to 
naturalize inferiority—a mechanism long used to justify oppression of racial, ethnic, and 
religious minorities.
30 
Eskridge characterizes current opposition to homosexuality as a 
―kinder, gentler‖ discourse, one that reflects a genuine decrease in virulence while 
remaining grounded in fear and disgust.
31 
¶18 In my view, some exemption proponents engage in Eskridge‘s ―kinder, gentler‖
discourse of disgust rather straightforwardly.  George Dent, for instance, opens a recent 
article with the assertion that homosexuality is inherently disfavored and unnatural:
―[D]isapproval of homosexuality is so widespread that it cannot be ascribed to theology.  
More likely, most people have an innate distaste for homosexuality.‖
32 
Dent‘s 
statements, of course, cannot be attributed to others,
33 
and I personally believe that many
proponents, including Dent, are sincere and well-intentioned.  Crucially, though, one can 
be sincerely well-intentioned and believe that gay people engage in unnatural behavior 
that marks us as congenitally inferior and a threat to heterosexual marriage. 
¶19 While views of proponents may provide some insight, my primary concern rests
with the exemption proposal itself.  The exemption proposal is a strange beast: it is 
presented solely in the context of religious objections to homosexuality, yet is drafted to 
encompass all protected grounds; it is presented solely in terms of marriage, yet in reality
extends to all forms of public accommodations and non-discrimination law imaginable.
34 
levels in mid-2007 while opposition has only now, in May 2008, declined back to where it stood in mid­
2003.‖ Charles Franklin, Gay Marriage Support and Opposition (May 21, 2008),
http://www.pollster.com/blogs/gay_marriage_support_and_oppos.php.
27 
See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010) (applying philosophical and constitutional analyses to argue that disgust is a 
fundamental motivation of persons opposing gay rights); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence
v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011 (2005).
 
28 
For a thorough examination of the argument that same-sex marriage threatens the institution of marriage,
 
see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR
 
WORSE?: WHAT WE'VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE (2006).

29 
Eskridge, supra note 27, at 1013.

30 
Id. at 1020 (citations omitted).
 
31 
Id. at 1062.
 
32 
Dent, supra note 6, at 555.

33 
Consider Chief Justice Marshall‘s oft-repeated caution concerning attributing what he called ―impure 

motives‖ to individual legislators, in which he asked, inter alia, ―Must the vitiating cause operate on a 

majority, or on what number of the members?‖ Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 130 (1810).
	
34 
As discussed in Part II, the exemptions extend beyond marriage by applying to most transactions of daily
life (such as housing, healthcare, and consumer purchases), as well as by applying whenever an objector
believes that he or she would be treating the couple as validly married, which may or may not require an
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There is a vast gulf between the exemptions‘ actual reach and proponents‘ claimed 
impact.  This suggests a distressing possibility: that irrespective of how well-intentioned 
individual proponents may be, some may be harnessing fears, disgust, and anxiety
surrounding same-sex marriage as a strategy to obtain state authorization to discriminate 
that otherwise would not garner sufficient legislative support.                 
¶20 In Part II, I examine the sweeping reach of the proposals and refute the assertion 
that equal marriage recognition will effect a widespread change in the law. In Part III, I
critique the status-conduct elision, used by some proponents to argue that sexual 
orientation discrimination is less injurious than discrimination against other protected 
classes, such as race or sex.  Furthermore, courts have long held that good intentions, 
including those religiously motivated, diminish neither the effect nor fact of 
discrimination.  Lastly, in Part IV, I analyze two related arguments made by some 
proponents: that religious exemptions to equal marriage statutes simply present a 
Wechslerian clash of symmetrical associational rights; and a proposal to assertedly
minimize the injury of a refusal to provide services by having objectors post signs 
informing same-sex couples we will be denied service in those establishments.  I
conclude that in both instances the state would not be merely facilitating associational 
rights, but instead would be overlaying a network of ―gay-only‖ licenses to discriminate
onto existing antidiscrimination protections.  
II. THE SWEEP OF THE PROPOSED EXEMPTIONS 
¶21 As discussed in Part I, the proposed language for religious exemptions is 
commonly the following: ―No individual . . . shall be liable, penalized, or denied benefits 
under the laws of this state or any subdivision . . . including but not limited to laws 
regarding employment discrimination, housing, public accommodations, licensing, 
government contracts or grants, or tax exempt status, for refusing to provide services . . . 
related to the solemnization of any marriage . . . or for refusing to treat as valid any
marriage, where such providing . . . or treating as valid would cause such individuals . . .
to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.‖
35 
A. Vagueness and Other Interpretive Challenges
¶22 The proposal‘s language is vague, which could result in a range of potential
outcomes, from those that are somewhat cabined to those that are far-reaching.  While a
detailed analysis of potential outcomes is beyond the scope of this article, I mention a few 
interpretive difficulties and then focus on the most troubling possibilities, which are those
with the broadest reach.  First, consider the clause, ―refusing to provide services . . . 
related to the solemnization of any marriage.‖
36 
Given that rings typically are a part of 
the solemnization of marriage, this exception could be read, for example, as permitting a
jewelry store owner to refuse to sell rings to a same-sex couple.  As discussed above, I
would object to this outcome, as it violates the principle, in place since early American 
common law, that those serving the public have a duty to serve all comers.
37 
actual legal marriage. See generally infra Part II.A–B. 

35 
Stern, supra note 1, at 307.
 
36 
Id.
 
37 
Callahan, supra note 18, at 226.
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¶23 Despite the vagueness concerning what constitutes ―solemnization,‖ the 
solemnization clause suggests some limits on its reach—whatever a court determines is
―related to‖
38 
solemnization.  The ―treatment clause,‖ in contrast, permits an objector to 
―refus[e] to treat as valid any marriage . . . where such . . . treating as valid would cause 
that individual . . . [or] corporation to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.‖
39 
This clause raises a host of interpretive difficulties, for which the answers are unclear.  
What constitutes treating a marriage as valid?  Can a corporation hold a sincerely-held 
religious belief, and if so, does this apply equally to a small family business as well as a 
Fortune 500 company? Is a legal, same-sex marriage a prerequisite to claim an 
exemption?  If not, is it sufficient that the person seeking services holds herself out as 
part of a same-sex couple, from which the objector might infer a marriage? What if the
person seeking services is openly gay, and from that the objector sincerely believes that 
by providing him or her services the objector would be facilitating the sin of same-sex
marriage?  Or, conversely, is the ―treatment‖ clause limited to the provision of services 
that turn on the fact of a couple‘s marriage, such as employee benefits or hospital 
visitation?
¶24 The scope of the proposed exemptions thus range from a fairly circumscribed set of
possible applications, on one hand, to authorization to engage in widespread status-based 
discrimination, on the other.  That the latter is a plausible interpretation worries me: it 
suggests that what is often presented as a modest proposal to protect religious liberty
reflects in actuality a larger goal to effectively eviscerate existing sexual orientation 
nondiscrimination protections. 
B. Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: Objections Based on Race, Sex, and Religion
¶25 While some of the above questions suggest limitations on the proposal‘s reach, the 
proposed language on its face appears to permit far-reaching exemptions with respect to 
the prohibited grounds for discrimination.  My queries immediately above—like the 
examples given by exemption advocates
40 
—presume objection to a same-sex marriage.  
Significantly, however, there is no such textual limitation: the proposed language applies 
when compliance with any of the antidiscrimination laws would ―cause such individuals     
. . . to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.‖
41 
This would exempt an objector 
from compliance with respect to nondiscrimination laws applying to any protected class, 
including, but not limited to, discrimination based on sexual orientation, sex, race, and 
religion itself. 
¶26 Given longstanding, deep-seated, and at times violent clashes among various 
religions based on theological, cultural, and historical conflicts, there is strong reason to 
expect a significant volume of claimed exemptions based on religious discrimination.
42 
38 
Stern, supra note 1, at 307.
39 
Id.

40
 
See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 3.  
41 
Stern, supra note 1, at 307.
42 
In an official church document released in 2004, for instance, Vatican officials discouraged marriage 
between Catholics and Muslims—especially Catholic women and Muslim men. Alan Feuer, Vatican
Discourages Marriage With Muslims for Catholic Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2004, at A2. Interfaith
marriage is generally opposed by Muslims, although Muslim men are permitted to marry women of other
faiths. See William V. Harris et al., In the Eyes of God: How Attachment Theory Informs Historical and
Contemporary Marriage and Religious Practices among Abrahamic Faiths, 39 J. COMP. FAM. STUDIES 259 
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So, too, with respect to sex: there is heated debate regarding issues such as women 
serving as clergy, and segregation from men in places of worship.
43 
With respect to race, 
some may object that such refusals are unlikely, since mainstream religious traditions do 
not oppose interracial marriage.  However, given the existence of contemporary white 
supremacist sects with a racialized theology, as well as the relatively recent acceptance of 
interracial marriages by many mainstream religions, the likelihood of race-based claims 
cannot be disregarded.
44 
Regarding sexual orientation, although proponents opine that 
requests for allowances will be rare, current laws and attitudes toward same-sex marriage
belie that prediction.  For example, there is far greater support for equal treatment of gay
persons in the workplace than for same-sex marriage,
45 
yet despite that support, lesbians 
and gay men nonetheless can be fired in more than half of the United States simply for
being gay.
46 
The persistent and widespread disapproval of same-sex marriage suggests
that, even in a state that enacts an equal marriage statute, the number of persons asserting
exemptions is likely to be substantial.
47 
¶27 Taken at face value, then, the proposed exemptions subject individuals to the risk 
of discrimination based on any classification protected by the state, including race, sex, 
sexual orientation, and religious belief.  In essence, such capacious exclusions convey
that those most vulnerable to discrimination with respect to marriage should either 
conform or risk discrimination in the public marketplace.  Given the myriad of sincerely-
held religious beliefs concerning who may or may not marry whom, antidiscrimination 
laws could not function effectively in our religiously pluralistic society.
¶28 Concerning the range of antidiscrimination laws at issue, the proposed language
would exclude religious objectors from compliance with what the Supreme Court in 
Romer v. Evans described as protections ―against exclusion from an almost limitless 
(2008). A poll taken in 2000 found that most American Jews accept marriages between Jews and non-
Jews, a position contrary to that held by most rabbis, Orthodox and non-Orthodox. Gustav Niebuhr,
Marriage Issue Splits Jews, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2000, at A25.
43 
For more information on inter- and intra-faith conflicts concerning the role of women in and among
various religious traditions, see, for example, Rachel Donadio, Anglican Leader Defends Faith as Vatican
Welcomes His Members, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, at A4 (discussing new Anglican rite within the 
Roman Catholic Church aimed at Anglicans uncomfortable with the ordination of women and gay clergy
members); Michael Luo, An Orthodox Jewish Woman, And Soon, a Spiritual Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2006, at B4 (reporting on a woman appointed as head of Orthodox congregation though not serving as a
rabbi).
44 
For example, Bob Jones University did not end its ban on interracial dating until March 2000, and only
then after its policy received widespread news coverage and criticism when George W. Bush spoke there 
during his 2000 presidential campaign. See Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups be Exempt from Civil 
Rights Laws, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 798–99 (2007). It was not until 1995 that the Southern Baptist 
Convention issued an apology for condoning racism from slavery through the Civil Rights era. Peter
Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1995, at A8. For more information on the rise of the Christian
Identity movement, which holds a white supremacist theology, in the United States during the 1980s and
1990s, see generally MICHAEL BARKUN, RELIGION AND THE RACIST RIGHT: THE ORIGINS OF THE 
CHRISTIAN IDENTITY MOVEMENT (1996).
45 
See discussion supra note 27.
46 
See, e.g., Lambda Legal, Employment and Rights in the Workplace,
http://www.lambdalegal.org/issues/employment-workplace/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2010) (describing that 
fewer than half of the states specifically prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in private employment).
47 
A Gallup poll released in May 2009 found that fifty-seven percent of Americans were opposed to same-
sex marriage; the poll noted that, in recent years, support for equal marriage has appeared to stall, peaking
at forty-six percent in 2007. Jeffrey Jones, Majority of Americans Continue to Oppose Gay Marriage,
GALLUP, May 27, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/118378/majority-americans-continue-oppose-gay­
marriage.aspx.
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number of transactions and endeavors that constitute civic life in a free society.‖
48 
The
expanse of the exemptions is made apparent by the language itself, which runs the gamut
of contexts in which clashes are likely to appear, set forth as an illustrative, non-
exhaustive list: the exemptions apply to all nondiscrimination prohibitions ―under the
laws of this state or any subdivision . . . including but not limited to laws regarding
employment discrimination, housing, public accommodations, licensing, government 
contracts or grants, or tax exempt status.‖
49 
The proposed exemptions touch every
aspect of commercial transactions involved in public and private life, including excusing
compliance with the full range of antidiscrimination laws, as well as any area in which 
the government offers services, grants, contracts, licenses, or tax-exempt status.  These
exemptions include crucial services central to daily life, such as employment, housing, 
healthcare, adoption, and education.  They also extend to many governmentally-provided 
(and tax-payer supported) benefits and services.  Likewise, release from accountability
reaches non-discrimination agreements signed as a condition of receiving government 
contracts, similar requirements for persons licensed to practice by the state, and tax-
exempt status for agreements to provide equal access to members of the public. 
¶29 In the academic literature, some proponents have included a narrowly-framed 
hardship exception related to the solemnization and/or licensing of marriage, over which 
the state holds a monopoly.
50 
Commentator Robin Fretwell Wilson argues that the
hardship exception protects religious liberty without harm because it does not block 
same-sex couples‘ access to marriage.
51 
The hardship exception misses (much of) the
point.  The injury to persons refused service extends beyond denial of a marriage license.  
No exemption is provided, for example, for refusals to rent an apartment to a same-sex
couple or the refusal to provide spousal healthcare benefits.  In addition, the hardship 
exemption fails to account for the primary harm of a refusal to serve—the dignitary and 
equality harm inherent in discrimination against a historically vulnerable minority. 
¶30 Finally, even the subject matter of the proposal is open to question. As discussed 
above, exemptions apply not only to the solemnization of marriage, but also extend to 
refusals to ―treat as valid‖ any marriage when to do so ―would cause such individuals . . .
to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs.‖
52 
Crucially, the language suggests that 
the determination of what constitutes ―treating [a marriage] as valid‖ is determined by the 
subjective belief of the objector.  The emphasis on ―treating‖ a marriage as valid makes it
unclear whether a legal marriage is a prerequisite for a religious objector to invoke an 
exemption.  What if the person seeking services holds herself out as part of a lesbian 
couple, and from that the religious objector sincerely believes he or she will be 
facilitating the sin of same-sex marriage?
¶31 Of course, at some point an objection may be so far removed from an objective
standpoint that a court could find that a particular belief is not sincerely held.  A 
determination of what is too far removed to constitute a sincerely held religious belief, 
however, is difficult to make.  Consider, for instance, an employer‘s decision to fire an 
employee who brings his husband to the office‘s annual holiday party, for which the 
48 
517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
 
49 
See Stern, supra note 1, at 307. 

50 
Id.

51 
Wilson, supra note 7, at 323.
 
52 
Stern, supra note 1, at 307.
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invitation states, ―Spouses invited.‖ In my view, this would not qualify as an exemption 
under the proposed language, as I believe there is an insufficient nexus between accepting
the couple‘s presence at a holiday party to constitute causing the employer to ―treat [their 
marriage] as valid‖; it is possible, however, particularly based on the sincerity of the
employer‘s belief, that a court could find this exemption to be valid.
C. No Sea Change or Flood 
¶32 The proposals are not only astonishingly broad but are also unnecessary.  
Proponents attempt to justify the wide-ranging license to discriminate with the assertion 
that the impact of equal marriage statutes will be enormous—working, as one
commentator warns, ―a sea change in American law . . . . [t]hat will reverberate across 
the legal and religious landscape.‖
53 
Advocates forecast a flood of new litigation against
individuals, small businesses, religious organizations (such as churches, mosques, or 
temples), and religious non-profits; in addition, some raise fears of curricular changes and
limits on expressive rights in public schools.
54 
Proponent Maggie Gallagher, for
instance, describes equal marriage laws as an ―equality right on steroids,‖ ―posing a new 
threat to religious liberty, and liberty of conscience generally.‖
55 
¶33 My argument is not—to use the dreaded double negative—that equal marriage
statutes pose no harm to religious liberty.  My point is that there will not be a dramatic 
increase in the volume of cases filed. To bolster their claim that exemptions for religious 
belief are necessary, proponents point to examples such as the decision of Catholic 
Charities in Boston to stop offering adoption services, the Ocean Grove Pavilion in New 
Jersey, which forfeited its public-access tax exemption, and governmental limits on the 
provision of state-owned facilities and fora to the Boy Scouts.
56 
Another commonly
raised fear is in the area of housing—that same-sex marriage laws will increase the 
number of landlords or religiously-affiliated universities who will be required to rent to 
same-sex couples.
57 
An additional oft-cited example is the ability of healthcare
providers, such as doctors in fertility clinics, to refuse services to same-sex couples.
58 
¶34 Such clashes do exist.  What proponents overlook, however is that the clashes they
cite, such as those above, typically do not involve marriage at all.  In fact, I was unable to 
find a single example cited by proponents that involved a religious objection to a legal, 
same-sex marriage.  With rare exception, the examples put forth by proponents take place
in states that do not permit same-sex marriage, pre-date the legalization of same-sex
marriage, or otherwise do not involve marriage.
59 
While not a large state, Massachusetts 
53 
Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS
 
LIBERTY, supra note 3, at 1 [hereinafter Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches].
 
54 
For an overview of examples that objectors to same-sex marriage claim will result if equal marriage 

rights are recognized, see Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amici Curiae at 2–14,
 
Chambers v. Ormiston, 916 A.2d 758 (R.I. 2007) (No. 06-340-M.P.) [hereinafter Becket Fund Amicus
 
Brief]. See also Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, supra note 53, at 7–52; see generally
 
Religious Liberty Letter, supra note 2.
 
55 
Gallagher, supra note 17, at 270.
 
56 
See, e.g., Becket Fund Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 2–8, 10–13.

57 
See, e.g., id. at 4–5; Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, supra at note 53, at 33–44.
 
58 
See, e.g., Dent, supra note 6, at 569–70.
 
59 
For a concise explanation of the ways in which equal marriage opponents‘ examples have nothing to do
	
with the recognition of equal marriage rights, see Brief for Religious Organizations & Clergy as Amici 

Curiae at 5–12, Chambers v. Ormiston, 916 A.2d 758 (R.I. 2007) (No. 06-340-M.P).
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has recognized equal marriage rights since 2004, and four other jurisdictions have since
followed suit.
60 
The lack of religious objections involving equal marriage recognition or 
the provision of services for same-sex marriages during the past six years seriously
undercuts proponents‘ claim of a flood of additional litigation.
¶35 To the contrary, the examples invoked by exemption proponents are proof that such 
conflicts have been occurring for decades, long before same-sex couples could marry.  
Objectors have long refused to facilitate what they believe to be the immoral conduct of 
gay people, and these objections have not depended on the legal status of same-sex
marriage.  In most instances the religious objector‘s basis for non-compliance will not be
marital status in se (i.e., ―I object to providing services to all married [or unmarried]
persons, regardless of sexual orientation‖), but instead is the sub-group of married 
persons defined by sexual orientation.
¶36 Proponents‘ real complaints lie with the status quo—their actual source of 
disagreement is with antidiscrimination, fair housing, and public accommodations laws, 
rather than marriage laws.  To be sure, advocates are free to object to the existing balance
between nondiscrimination laws and religious liberty, and to argue that it should be
weighted differently.  But that is not what proponents are arguing: instead, they argue that 
equal marriage rights will create a sea change in the law, necessitating correspondingly
expansive protections for religious liberty.
61 
My concern is that some proponents appear 
to be seizing on the highly-charged issue of same-sex marriage as a vehicle or possible 
pretext, in order to dramatically curtail existing sexual orientation protections.  
III. LOVE THE SINNER, HATE THE SIN: ANIMUS, RELIGIOUS BELIEF, AND BENEVOLENT
INTENT
¶37 A white Louisiana Justice of the Peace, Keith Bardwell, recently refused to marry
an interracial couple.
62 
I raise the Bardwell incident not to suggest that such refusals will
be common—in fact, religious belief was not the basis of his refusal, though such an 
exception from liability is possible under exemption advocates‘ proposed language.
63 
Instead, I raise it to make a milder observation: the media coverage of this incident 
rightfully presumed that Bardwell‘s refusal to marry the couple caused them extreme 
personal pain and injury.
64 
¶38 Some exemption proponents, in contrast, assert that religiously based refusals to 
marry a same-sex couple typically do not inflict a comparable harm to personhood.  For
example, while acknowledging that ―much antigay animus is just like racism,‖ Andrew 
60 
Following the decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003),
 
same-sex marriage has been legal in Massachusetts since May 2004. See Pam Belluck, Same Sex
 
Marriage: The Overview; Hundreds of Same-Sex Couples Wed in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
 
2004, at A1.
 
61 
Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, supra note 53, at 1.
 
62 
See, e.g., NBC Nightly News (NBC television broadcast Oct. 16, 2009); CNN News (CNN cable 

broadcast Oct. 16, 2009).

63 
See supra Part II.B (discussing proposed exemptions‘ applicability to religious objections based on
	
grounds including race, religion, and sex).
 
64 
NBC Nightly News, supra note 62 (describing ―painful call [by fiancée who had been refused
 
solemnization] to her fiancé to break the news‖); CNN News, supra note 62 (reporter stating to another
 
reporter that the story ―certainly must hit a nerve for you . . . given [that] . . . your mom and . . . dad [are]
	
. . . an interracial couple‖).
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Koppelman argues that ―[n]ot all antigay views deny the personhood and equal 
citizenship of gay people.‖
65 
As an example, Koppelman offers Peterson v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., in which Mr. Peterson was fired from his job for violating the employer‘s 
sexual orientation nondiscrimination policy.
66 
As part of a workplace diversity
campaign, Hewlett-Packard (HP) displayed posters of its employees with the caption, 
―Black . . . Blonde . . . Old . . . Gay . . . or . . . Hispanic,‖ along with another set of posters 
that presented the profiles of the same employees, along with the caption, ―Diversity is 
Our Strength.‖
67 
In response, Peterson placed biblical verses on an overhead bin in his 
work cubicle, printed in lettering large enough to be visible to passersby, including the 
verse, ―If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have
committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be put upon 
them.‖
68 
Peterson testified that he had a religious duty to expose evil when confronted 
with sin,
69 
and that he was motivated by a desire for gay persons to experience the joys of 
being saved.
70 
¶39 Addressing whether Peterson‘s actions denied the personhood and equal citizenship 
of his gay co-workers, Koppelman asserts, ―[c]ertainly Peterson's views did not do 
that.‖
71 
Koppelman distinguishes Peterson‘s motives from those characterizing racism,
which he describes as ―virulence of the rage it bespeaks and the hatred that it directs 
toward those who are its objects.‖
72 
Koppelman claims ―the gay rights issue is different,‖
presumably because of the benevolent, non-subordinating motivations such as 
Peterson‘s.
73 
Peterson‘s religious belief springs from an obligation to, as it is commonly
phrased, ―love the sinner but hate the sin.‖
74 
For Koppelman, this benevolent motivation 
distinguishes a racist refusal to marry an interracial couple, which Koppelman asserts is 
motivated by an invidious hatred and assumption of inferiority.
75 
Rather than 
constituting an injury to equality or personhood, Koppelman instead characterizes 
Peterson‘s sexual orientation-based religious objection as creating merely ―a certain kind 
of insult.‖
76 
A. For Your Own Good
¶40 The line of reasoning above reflects key misconceptions in the tension
problematically referred to by some equal marriage opponents as a seemingly mutually
exclusive election between ―gay rights‖ and ―religious rights.‖
77 
As an initial matter, the
65 
Koppelman, supra note 21, at 145.

66 
Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004).
 
67 
Id. at 601.
 
68 
Id. at 601–02 (quoting LEVITICUS 20:13).
 
69 
Id. at 601.
 
70 
Id. at 604; see also Gallagher, supra note 17, at 271 (―[R]espect for conscience . . . presumptively
 
includes the right and duty to critique each other‘s consciences, not to be free from painful or upsetting
	
controversy about the nature of God . . . or the content of the moral good.‖).
	
71 
Koppelman, supra note 21, at 145.
 
72 
Id.
 
73 
Id.

74 
On the use of the term ―love the sinner, hate the sin,‖ see discussion supra note 20.
 
75 
Koppelman, supra note 21, at 145.
 
76 
Id. at 135.
 
77 
See supra note 6 and accompanying text (arguing that framing the issue as one of ―religious rights‖ 

versus ―gay rights‖ is misleading, as it overlooks the fact that many religious traditions support same-sex
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above characterization of race discrimination is woefully incomplete, reflecting first 
generation race cases, but failing to capture contemporary understandings and forms of
race discrimination.  The notion of an actor with conscious, invidious racist intent is 
indeed paradigmatic: the laws at issue in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. 
Virginia certainly reflect the notion of a class of persons deemed ―intrinsically inferior,‖
as well as the ―virulen[ce] . . . and . . . hatred . . . direct[ed] toward those who are its
objects.‖
78 
However, an extensive body of scholarship demonstrates that racism is far 
more prevalent and far less conscious than this paradigm suggests.  Instead, race
discrimination often stems from unconscious stereotyping and implicit bias.
79 
¶41 A related misconception is that discriminatory motive is necessarily (or even 
primarily) grounded in hatred.  To the contrary, discrimination frequently may be
justified in the discriminator‘s mind as being for the greater good: women are better off at 
home or in certain types of jobs; it is better for people of all races not to intermarry.  
Whether marginalized because of race, sex, sexual orientation, disability, or other
grounds, American history is replete with examples of discriminatory actions justified— 
frequently with benevolent sincerity—as being for the good of the group being
discriminated against.  In refusing to marry interracial couples, Keith Bardwell
specifically disclaimed hostile intent, stating, ―I‘m not a racist‖ and adding that he has 
―piles and piles of black friends.‖
80 
As a quick search of popular culture attests, ―I have
black friends‖ is so widely recognized as a paean to racism that it serves as a basis for
social commentary and stand-up routines.
81 
A white person‘s assertion of having ―black 
friends‖ to prove her non-racist intent has traction precisely because it may genuinely
reflect a lack of conscious racist animosity, even though it simultaneously flags 
unconscious bias.  
¶42 It is neither necessary, nor perhaps possible, to disentangle unconscious bias and
stereotyping from animosity fueled by hatred.  The law appropriately holds
discrimination actionable whether based in paternalism or motivated by benevolence.  As 
the Supreme Court made clear in Frontiero v. Richardson, an early sex-based challenge, 
discrimination often coincides with a desire to save those deemed in need of protection.
82 
In Frontiero, the Court explicitly rejected the notion that discrimination escapes liability
simply because it is well-intentioned.
83 
Invoking Bradwell v. Illinois, the infamous
decision in which the Supreme Court had upheld a ban prohibiting women from 
practicing law, the Frontiero majority specifically refuted the notion that a presumptive
marriage, many gay persons are religious, and many gay persons support religious liberty).

78 
Koppelman, supra note 21, at 135.
 
79 
See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1199 (1995) (examining
 
cognitive psychology findings that intentional discrimination model is too narrow to capture most 

discrimination, which is the result of implicit stereotyping or bias); Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego,
 
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 329–44 (1987)
 
(critiquing the constitutional requirement of discriminatory intent where there is discriminatory impact, 

given that much contemporary racial discrimination is unconscious).

80 
See Interracial Marriage Denied, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2009, at 17.

81 
See, e.g., Jordan Carlos, Op-ed, My Shtick? Being Black, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2007,
 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/05/AR2007010501613.html; Kyle 

Grooms, Being the Black Friend, http://comedians.jokes.com/kyle-grooms/videos/kyle-grooms---being-the­
black-friend (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
 
82 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (discussing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873)).
 
83 
Id. 
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desire to protect women (which, in Bradwell, was based in part on religious belief) could 
be a reason to excuse discrimination: ―Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized 
by an attitude of ‗romantic paternalism‘ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a 
pedestal, but in a cage.‖
84 
¶43 Were the Supreme Court to hold otherwise, the gamut of paternalistic
stereotyping—whether related to race, sex, disability, sexual orientation, or other
grounds—would simply be exonerated from liability.  Returning briefly to Peterson, I 
accept that Peterson desired to save gay people. My point, though, is that cases such as 
Frontiero got it right.  Neither religious nor presumptively benevolent or paternalistic
motivations, such as Peterson‘s desire to save gay people, justify discrimination.  Nor do 
such motivations diminish the harm to personhood experienced by any gay co-workers 
who read his assertion that they should be put to death.
B. Gay Rights Are Different (Or Are They?): The Status-Conduct Conflation
¶44 Some exemption proponents object that there remains a qualitative difference
between benevolent (and arguably paternalistic) rationales for race and sex, on one hand, 
and sexual orientation, on the other.  Paternalistic objections to women engaging in 
professional life, it may be argued, go to the heart of female identity itself.  Myra
Bradwell was deemed unfit to practice law due to the presumed ―natural and proper 
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex.‖
85 
What is impermissible in 
Bradwell v. Illinois, it could be argued, is that the Supreme Court determined, as a matter 
of law, that women are inherently different from, and subordinate to men; the law is 
essentializing (and ordering) difference.  An exception permitting discrimination against
gay people, some proponents argue, does not turn on essentialized notions of inferiority.  
Mr. Peterson‘s sincere belief that we are all flawed sinners, it is argued, is inconsistent 
with an invidious assumption of inferiority.  When it comes to gay people, then, there is 
no comparable harm from religiously-based discrimination because that which is deemed 
sinful is our conduct, rather than ourselves. 
¶45 The assertion that religious objections to homosexuality reflect an opposition to 
same-sex sexual activity
86 
rather than to homosexual persons is nothing more and nothing
less than an invocation of the status-conduct distinction.  As a religious matter, this 
distinction is a deep and meaningful one for many, demarcating salvation or sin. There
is, in contrast, a well-developed body of law and scholarship analyzing the dangers of
reliance upon the status-conduct distinction as a legal matter.  The distinction between 
status and conduct is flawed because it is so porous.  With two much-criticized 
87 88
exceptions (military regulations and employment appearance regulations ), the law
84 
Id. 

85 
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 143 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
 
86 
See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 17, at 272 (characterizing sexual desire or orientation as a status,
 
distinguishable from sexual behavior, and arguing that ―the race analogy‖—a status—―conceptually fails
	
. . . because [acting on one‘s sexual orientation] is behavior‖).
	
87 
Ostensibly conduct-based regulations, which in actuality target status, such as religion and sexual 

orientation, have been upheld in the highly regimented environment of the military, when the asserted need
 
is to preserve homogeneity to minimize conflict and preserve national security. See, e.g., Goldman v.
 
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506–07 (1986) (upholding military ban on wearing yarmulkes on duty on
 
ground that ―the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society‖ and ―[t]he 

military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such tolerance is required of the 
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widely rejects the status-conduct distinction as a defense to claimed discrimination.  In 
fact, a principal area in which the distinction has been raised—and rejected—is that of 
religious discrimination.  As scholars have noted, sexual orientation and religion share a
similarity: both are frequently defined in part by conduct that at once expresses and 
defines one‘s identity and beliefs.
89 
In its comment that ―[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is
a tax on Jews,‖ the Supreme Court has succinctly encapsulated the problematic
slipperiness of the status-conduct distinction, in which conduct may be a stand-in for
status.
90 
Federal statutory law likewise makes the impermissibility of a religious status-
conduct elision explicit, specifically prohibiting discrimination based on ―all aspects of 
religious observance and practice.‖
91 
Because religious conduct is so closely linked to 
one‘s religious identity, a defense that the target was conduct (the wearing of a head-
scarf, the taking of communion), rather than a particular religion, generally will be
unavailing.
92 
¶46 The law has likewise widely rejected the status-conduct distinction with respect to 
sexual orientation.  In the political asylum context, for example, courts have rejected 
government arguments that persecution had been based on same-sex sexual conduct 
rather than homosexual status; this is, as the Third Circuit stated, ―a distinction without a 
civilian state by the First Amendment‖) (internal quotations omitted); Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 57–58
(1st Cir. 2008) (emphasizing deference to Congressional judgment in military affairs upholding military‘s
ban on gay service members), cert. denied sub nom. Pietrangelo v. Gates 129 S.Ct. 2763 (2009). There 
have also been pro-gay attempts to invoke the status-conduct distinction, which I have criticized. Taylor
Flynn, Of Communism, Treason, and Addiction: An Evaluation of Novel Challenges to the Military’s Anti-
Gay Policy, 80 IOWA L. REV. 979 (1995) (arguing that, despite some lower court successes, challenges to
military‘s anti-gay ban should refrain from invoking status-conduct distinction).
88 
Courts have upheld ostensibly conduct-based appearance regulations in employment that target status,
such as race and sex. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (upholding
prohibition on wearing clothing not associated with one‘s designated birth sex, purportedly a form of
―conduct,‖ but implicating gender identity); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(upholding prohibition on wearing braided hair styles, including corn rows, purportedly a form of
―conduct,‖ but implicating racial identity). I and others have drawn on insights from critical race theory
that the status-based nature of the regulations are unrecognized because they reflect majority race and
gender stereotypes, and hence, are effectively rendered invisible because so ubiquitous. See, e.g., Taylor
Flynn, Instant (Gender) Messaging: Expression-Based Challenges to State Enforcement of Gender Norms, 
18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 465, 500–03 (2009) (arguing that challenges by transgender plaintiffs to
dress codes are paradoxically often more successful than those by non-trans identified women because 
transgender status highlights stereotyped nature of prevailing gender norms); Barbara J. Flagg, ―Was Blind
but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 953, 957 (1992–1993) (discussing ―transparency phenomenon,‖ in which, in the absence of a person
of color, white persons‘ race and the background norm of whiteness is experienced as invisible to them).
89 
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, What Would It Mean to Have a “First Amendment” for Sexual 
Orientation?, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE 234
(Saul M. Olyan & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1998).
90 
Bray v. Alexandria Women‘s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993). In contrast, as discussed supra at 
note 85, the Supreme Court has upheld a ban on wearing yarmulkes in the military, given the particular
exigencies of military life. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 506–07.
91 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006).
92 
The same is true in other areas of the law as well. Concerning national origin discrimination, for
example, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC) has expressed ―particular concern‖ 
over denials of job opportunities that are conduct-based yet serve as a stand-in for national origin,
including, tellingly, marriage to someone of a national origin group. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2008). Other
examples set forth by the EEOC include membership in an organization seeking to promote the interests of
national origin groups and attendance at schools or places of worship commonly associated with a national 
origin group. Id.
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difference.‖
93 
Although the context concerned criminal sanction, which is particularly
stigmatic, the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas not only rejected the state‘s attempt to 
portray Texas‘ same-sex sodomy statute as ―purport[ing] to do no more than prohibit a 
particular sexual act,‖
94 
but also went further, explicitly recognizing that such laws 
encourage additional status-based discrimination, with presumed government approval:
―When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in 
and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination, both in the 
public and in the private spheres.‖
95 
¶47 Consider again Mr. Peterson‘s posting of the Bible verse; his actions demonstrate 
that gayness is so often conflated with gay sex that the synthesis of the two is barely
perceptible.  Peterson was presented with a list of identity (status) categories: ―Black, 
Blonde, Old, Gay, Hispanic.‖ In what was likely an automatic response, he converted
one of those categories (―gay‖) to conduct (gay sex: ―man lie[ing] with mankind‖).  Nor
can Peterson be blamed for doing so.  ―Who one is” and ―whom one loves‖ are often 
inextricably bound. While Peterson‘s quotations were clearly from the Bible, neither the
religious nor presumptively benevolent nature of his beliefs diminishes the injury
experienced: it is difficult to imagine a clearer example of a denial of personhood than a
statement by your co-worker that you will be put to death for falling in love, expressing
that love as mature adults do, and perhaps building a family together.
¶48 A related difficulty with the attempt to distinguish the harm to gay persons based 
on the religious objector‘s distinction between status and conduct is that the point of view 
of the discriminator is determinative of whether harm is experienced.  Professor 
Koppelman urges us to consider Peterson‘s experience, emphasizing the sincerity of 
Peterson‘s belief and asserting that ―Peterson was obviously an outlier.‖
96 
I do not doubt
the former assertion, as Peterson was willing to jeopardize his twenty-year employment 
with HP.  
¶49 I do question the latter.  HP is headquartered in California, where, as its diversity
campaign suggests, it applies nationwide the nondiscrimination mandates of its home
state.  This dispute, however, took place in Idaho, a state that has no sexual orientation 
antidiscrimination protections and that has both statutory and state constitutional 
DOMAs.
97 
For Peterson‘s gay coworkers, HP may be the one of the only (or perhaps the
sole) employer in the state that not only has voluntarily adopted a sexual orientation 
93 
Maldonado v. Attorney Gen., 188 F. App‘x 101, 104 (3d Cir. 2006) (whether injury is based on
homosexual conduct or status is a distinction without a difference); see also Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d
1163, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2005) (same, stating that there is ―no appreciable difference‖ between the two).
94 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). See also id. at 583 (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (―While . . .
true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct . . . is closely correlated with being homosexual . . . .
Texas‘ sodomy law . . . is instead directed toward gay persons as a class.‖).
95 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. For a more in-depth discussion of the role of the imprimatur of the state, see
 
infra Part IV.
 
96 
Koppelman, supra note 21, at 144.
 
97 
See, e.g., Human Rights Campaign, Idaho Non-Discrimination Law, http://www.hrc.org/4165.htm (last 

visited Sept. 9, 2010) (noting that ―[n]o provision of Idaho law explicitly addresses discrimination based on
sexual orientation‖ and that ―no court has found [it] actionable under‖ other nondiscrimination provisions); 
Human Rights Campaign, Idaho State Law Listings,
http://www.hrc.org/laws_and_elections/state_law_listing.asp?state=Idaho&btnG.x=11&btnG.y=8 (last
visited Sept. 9, 2010) (―Idaho law and the state constitution both purport to ban marriage for same-sex
couples. There are no other forms of relationship recognition for same-sex couples in state law or
policies.‖).
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nondiscrimination policy, but also takes affirmative steps, such as the diversity campaign, 
to support its gay employees.  In fact, a death threat, albeit biblical, could feel truly
threatening in a state where, just four years after the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Peterson, 
there was a spate of anti-gay bias crimes.
98 
¶50 The attempt to distinguish race from sexual orientation discrimination on the
ground that religious objectors such as Peterson ―love the sinner but hate the sin‖ is 
additionally flawed because it defines the nature of the harm according to the 
discriminator‘s viewpoint.  Reliance on religious belief as the sole measure of whether a
certain kind of harm is experienced is, at the very least, highly questionable—it removes
half of the equation. Moreover, it removes the half that many would consider to be the 
more relevant in evaluating the harm of discrimination: the experience of the person 
discriminated against.  I am confident that most gay people would consider a refusal to 
provide them services related to their marriage an injury to personhood; surely, when 
assessing the nature of the harm, the experience of the class of persons harmed is not
beside the point. Finally, the attempt to distinguish the harm by asserting that religious 
objectors do not consider gay people to be inherently inferior is itself problematic: as 
discussed above, it is at least possible that one may love the sinner and believe she is 
inferior—that her needs and desires are not as worthy as those of heterosexuals.  
IV. SIGN-POSTING AND OTHER ICONS OF SECOND-CLASS CITIZENSHIP
¶51 As discussed in Part II, the proposed exemptions would permit a landlord to refuse
to rent to a married same-sex couple, an employer to refuse to provide healthcare benefits 
to a same-sex spouse, and even a Justice of the Peace, employed by the government and 
paid by our tax dollars, to refuse to marry a same-sex couple.
99 
In an attempt to minimize
the hurt, some advocates suggest that objectors could post signs indicating their refusal to 
serve. 
100 
In this way, they claim, same-sex couples will be spared the additional wound 
resulting from a face-to-face refusal of service; they simply select another landlord, 
employer, or Justice of the Peace.  Such sign-posting, I respond, is iconic of second-class 
citizenship, and for good reason: even combined with a voluntary adoption of an equal 
marriage statute, the state is carving out a ―gay exception‖ to the panoply of applicable 
antidiscrimination laws.  Lastly, I consider the related claim that the proposed exemptions 
merely facilitate equally balanced associational rights, and respond that they instead 
reflect an underlying subordination based on sexual orientation.
98 
See Jody May-Chang, GLAAD Calls on Media to Investigate a Recent String of Anti-Gay Bias Crimes in
Washington and Idaho, PRIDEDEPOT.COM, Oct. 31, 2008, http://www.pridedepot.com/?p=738347
(describing call to investigate string of anti-gay bias crimes in Washington and Idaho in fall 2008).
99 
As discussed supra at note 4, some academic drafts include a narrow hardship exception that would
require compliance where a party is ―unable to obtain any similar services . . . elsewhere and . . . such
inability . . . constitute a substantial hardship‖; in what hopefully is meant to be a separate clause, it also
provides that ―no government official may refuse to solemnize a marriage if another government official is
unable or unwilling to do so.‖ Stern, supra note 1, at 308. In proposals submitted to state legislatures of
which I am aware, however, no hardship language was included. See discussion supra note 4.
100 
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Afterword, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 3, at 
189, 198–99. This was also discussed during the Journal of Law and Social Policy’s 2009 Symposium,
which took place on November 12, 2009.
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A. Sign-Posting and the Imprimatur of the State
¶52 In the afterword to a book of collected works devoted to the subject of proposed
exemptions to equal marriage laws, Douglas Laycock writes that to avoid ―unfair 
surprise,‖ he ―would have no objection to a requirement that merchants that refuse to 
serve same-sex couples announce that fact on their website or, for businesses with only a
local service area, on a sign outside their premises.‖
101 
While presumably well­
intentioned, the resemblance to earlier systems of segregation—whether ―Whites only,‖
―Irish need not apply,‖ or ―Male help wanted‖—is, as Justice Blackmun noted in another 
gay rights context, ―almost uncanny.‖
102 
For me, the lack of appreciation of the harm 
caused by such sign-posting is more than uncanny; it is unnerving.  Needless to say, the 
resemblance to Jim Crow and other systems of segregation has not gone unnoticed by
those who suggest sign-posting; as Laycock acknowledges, ―In more traditional 
communities, same-sex couples planning a wedding might be forced to pick their
merchants carefully, like black families driving across the South half a century ago.‖
103 
I 
find myself feeling personally shaken because these are proposals made by thoughtful, 
intelligent, well-meaning individuals.  
¶53 Expressive rights are, of course, a double-edged sword.  Particularly in a largely
―gay-friendly‖ state (in which equal marriage statutes are most likely), some supporters 
of same-sex marriage may approve of sign-posting, as it provides a means of informing
them which business establishments to support or boycott.  Consider Doe v. Reed, in 
which the organization ―Protect Marriage Washington,‖ a sponsor of a referendum to 
stop implementation of a state domestic partners law, argued that its members and other
signatories had a right to keep their identities anonymous, asserting they would endure
harassment and retaliation if their identities were revealed.
104 
Interestingly, one example
the Reed plaintiffs put forward to support their claim of harassment was the
constitutionally protected tool of boycotting businesses, a safeguarded, expressive means 
to bring about social change.
105 
Consider also the so-called ―Mrs. Murphy‖ exemption to 
the Fair Housing Act, which provides that if a dwelling has four or fewer rental units and
the owner lives in one of those units, the owner can discriminate but cannot advertise her 
discrimination.
106 
Because Congress permits race discrimination under these
circumstances, there is a strong argument that racist advertising should be permitted to 
alert consumers of the risk of discrimination or for boycotting purposes.  Sign-posting
similarly could be useful to same-sex marriage supporters, whether for purposes of
101 
Laycock, supra note 100, at 198.
 
102 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 n.5 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
 
103 
Laycock, supra note 100, at 199.
 
104 
Doe v. Reed, No. 09-559, 2010 WL 2518466 (June 24, 2010) (upholding disclosure requirements as a
 
facial matter).

105 
Protect Marriage Washington cited boycotts in California as an example of retaliation. See, e.g., 

ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (denying preliminary injunction to
 
remove from disclosure the names of putative class arguing members were subject to harassment, including
 
boycotts, because of their support of Proposition 8, which amended California's constitution to define 

marriage as only between one man and one woman). During the racial civil rights movement, boycotting
 
of businesses was a constitutionally protected tool to bring about social change. See, e.g., NAACP v.
 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913–15 (1982) (holding that nonviolent boycott aimed at protesting
 
racial discrimination is a legitimate form of petitioning activity that goes to core First Amendment values).
 
106 
42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2006).
 
255
        
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
   
                                                 
               
            
        
             
              
 
          
          
         
           
          
          
           
        
   
        
           
            
        
    
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F LAW AND SOC IA L P O LIC Y [ 2 0 1 0 
avoiding a face-to-face refusal to serve or as a means of identifying equal marriage
opponents for social movement purposes.
¶54 While sign-posting has some positive uses for equal marriage supporters, its 
benefits, I believe, are outweighed by its dangers.  Sign-posting is iconic of second-class 
citizenship.  It bestows upon individual shop-keepers, landlords, and even government 
officials the permission to determine whom they will serve in the public realm.  It does so 
with the sanction of law.  And it does so by targeting a single, marginalized group.
107 
Whether phrased obliquely in terms of marriage (―Services provided for traditional 
marriage only‖) or conduct (―As a landlord, it violates my beliefs to facilitate homosexual 
conduct by providing housing to married same-sex couples‖), the import of the message
is the same: ―No Gays Served Here.‖ Nor does sign-posting avoid the harm of a refusal 
to serve.  To the contrary, even assuming sign-posting makes the injury more diffuse (as 
fewer same-sex couples presumably would seek that establishment‘s services), 
dissemination of the discriminatory message becomes even more widespread, as it can be
read by all passers-by. 
¶55 Exemption proponents could argue that the state is not placing its approval on the
refusal to serve; instead, the government is simply granting respect to individuals‘ 
religious beliefs.  The state-provided exemption, however, is the sine qua non for the 
sign-posting; it could not exist without the imprimatur of the state.
108 
This is true even in 
the closest case, that in which a state voluntarily adopts an equal marriage statute in the 
absence of a directive from the judicial branch.  Exemption proponents doubtless would 
argue that such a state could not possibly be sending a message of second class 
citizenship when voluntarily conferring the right to marry upon gay persons.  Even 
though voluntary legislative action without a court order is a closer case, I would respond 
that the state is nonetheless giving the green light to discrimination.  In pairing equal 
marriage rights with religious exemptions, the state simultaneously carves out a new 
authorization to discriminate, based on sexual orientation alone. 
¶56 The symbolic and social meaning of such authorizations can have powerful, 
concrete ramifications in individuals‘ lives. Consider the recently publicized hospital 
109 110
visitation rights case, in which Florida‘s DOMA was used to justify overriding a
107 
As set forth supra at Parts II and III, it is not determinative that the exemption is phrased in terms of
based on religious belief, rather than sexual orientation. As proponents‘ writings demonstrate, and the 
likely outcome of adjudicated cases suggest, same-sex marriage is the impetus for the exemptions.
Moreover, even if there are refusals on other grounds (e.g., sex, race, religion), ―[e]qual protection of the 
laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.‖ Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948).
108 
I use the term ―imprimatur‖ to connote a sign of approval by the state, with symbolic as well as potential 
legal ramifications. While the latter has great power on constitutional grounds (perhaps providing a finding
of state action), the former, as discussed immediately below, can have equally powerful ramifications.
109 
The case came to national attention when President Obama issued a memo to his Health and Human
Services agency, requiring all hospitals receiving Medicare and Medicaid money to honor all patients‘
advance directives, including those designating who gets family visitation privileges. After signing the 
memo, President Obama called Langbehn personally to apologize. Kathleen Hennessey, Obama Grants
Gays More Rights: Most Hospitals Must Give Same-Sex Partners Visitation Privileges, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
16, 2010, at 1.
110 
A ―mini-DOMA‖ refers to state constitutional amendments or statutes, which, like their federal Defense 
of Marriage Act counterpart, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1997), define marriage as between one man and one woman.
Florida had adopted Proposition 2, which amended its constitution, as well as a statutory DOMA, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 741.212. See, e.g., DOMAWatch.org, Florida,
http://www.domawatch.org/stateissues/florida/index.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
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power of attorney.  Janice Langbehn, along with her children, was denied the right to see
Janice‘s partner of over twenty years, who was dying from a fatal brain aneurysm.
111 
A 
hospital employee asserted that the power of attorney was irrelevant because, as Florida‘s 
DOMA made clear, Janice was ―in an antigay city and antigay state.‖
112 
In effect, the
employee ―read‖ the state‘s DOMA as a license to discriminate.  
¶57 It is this emboldening of citizens to discriminate that troubles me deeply.  Like 
Florida‘s DOMA, the proposed exemptions present a similar or potentially greater risk:
they specifically empower individuals to determine for themselves whether to extend 
equal treatment to lesbians and gay men in the public realm.  Nor is the imprimatur 
limited to the statute itself.  There may be a cascading effect that encourages additional 
claims for exemption as well as other acts of discrimination.  Seeing the equivalent of ―no 
gays served here‖ affixed throughout town, all with the permission of the state, may spur 
further acts of discrimination or violence.
¶58 Nor are such concerns a parade of horribles.  As Justice O‘Connor noted in her 
concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas, the fact of collateral effects resulting from a state
imprimatur of discrimination has been acknowledged even by a discriminating state
itself.  While concededly concerning the greater social stigma of a criminal conviction, 
the state of Texas had stipulated in an earlier decision that its sodomy statute ―legally
sanctions discrimination against [homosexuals] in a variety of ways unrelated to the
criminal law,‖ including in the areas of ―employment, family issues, and housing.‖
113 
During its relatively short life, the reach of Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court‘s 
decision upholding sodomy laws, was extensive, branding gay parents as ―criminals‖ 
unfit for custody, prohibiting some gay people from practicing their profession, and 
requiring others to register as sex offenders.
114 
And while perhaps impossible to prove, it
is reasonable to assume, as Kendall Thomas does, that ―homophobic laws lend the 
imprimatur of the state to the consonant homophobic violence undertaken by ‗private‘
actors.‖
115 
B. Echoes of Wechsler, and a Refutation of Asserted Symmetry
¶59 Some exemption proponents attempt to portray the conflict between religious 
objectors in the marketplace and gay persons seeking services as a symmetrical clash 
between competing associational rights.  ―The most important consequence of
privatization,‖ write Professors Dent and Koppelman, ―is that members of both groups 
would be free to refuse to associate with the other.‖
116 
The resemblance to Herbert 
Wechsler‘s critique of Brown v. Board of Education is striking.  Wechsler framed the
111 
Complaint at 10, Langbehn v. Jackson Mem‘l Hosp., No. 08-21813 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2008), available 
at http://data.lambdalegal.org/pdf/legal/langbehn/langbehn-complaint-6-08.pdf
112 
Id.
113 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Morales, 826
 
S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex.App. 1992)).
 
114 
Id. (discussing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
 
115 
Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV.
 
1805 (1993).
 
116 
ANDREW KOPPELMAN & GEORGE W. DENT, MUST GAY RIGHTS CONFLICT WITH RELIGIOUS LIBERTY? 8
(forthcoming 2010). See also Koppelman, supra note 21, at 135 (―If [religious objectors] are ‗constantly
vulnerable‘ to forced association with gay people, will this not be ‗a deep, intense and tangible hurt‘ to
them?‖) (internal citations omitted).
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issue at the heart of segregation as one in which ―the state must practically choose
between denying the association to those individuals who wish it or imposing it on those
who would avoid it.‖
117 
¶60 Wechsler asserted that there was no principled basis for choosing between 
competing associational rights; as a result, he argued, Brown should not have disturbed 
the choice made by the states.
118 
If faced with a challenge to the exemption proposals, 
advocates presumably would likewise depict the issue as an even-handed choice of 
associational rights, between which the state is free to choose.  Importantly, however, this 
assumption ignores the subordination inherent in state-sponsored permission to 
discriminate against an unpopular minority.  Wechsler famously commented that his
colleague, Charles Hamilton Houston, ―did not suffer more than I in knowing we had to 
go to Union Station to lunch together during the [Supreme Court‘s] recess‖ due to the
pervasive racial segregation in the District of Columbia.
119 
¶61 As many more notable than myself have responded, glaringly absent from 
Wechsler‘s account is the message of inferiority inherent in segregation.
120 
It also oddly
overlooks a distinction at the heart of white supremacy: the unconcealed fact of a one-
way ratchet, in which whites can patronize establishments designated for African 
Americans, but not the reverse.  Even as early as 1896, the discriminatory purpose 
underlying assertedly equivalent associational rights in segregation was not lost on some; 
as Justice Harlan pointedly noted, ―Every one knows . . . . [t]he thing to accomplish was, 
under the guise of giving equal accommodation for whites and blacks, to compel the
latter to keep to themselves.‖
121 
Inseverable from subordination are the process concerns: 
race discrimination represents a failure of the political process, in which the majority in 
effect usurped legislative power to confine the rights of an unpopular minority.
122 
As 
Martha Nussbaum explains, ―Wechsler is basically asking us to look at everyone as if 
they were placed as are the powerful.‖
123 
¶62 Wechsler‘s search for neutral principles failed because his baseline was not
neutral—inconvenience is not equivalent to inferiority.  In the context of the exemptions, 
proponents speculate that the number of religious objectors will be small, a portrayal 
117 
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959).
 
118 
Id. at 34–35.
 
119 
Id. at 34. For an in-depth chronicling of the ways in which Charles Hamilton Houston (who, because he 

was African American was barred from eating in the ―whites-only‖ cafeteria in the U.S. Capitol) utilized
 
his Harvard Law School education and role as the NAACP Litigation Director to train Thurgood Marshall 

and ultimately defeat Jim Crow laws, see THE ROAD TO BROWN: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE MAN WHO 

KILLED JIM CROW (California Newsreel 1990).
 
120 
See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960)
 
(replying that ―a whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which is set up and continued
 
for the very purpose of keeping it in an inferior station‖); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword:
 
Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28–30
 
(2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Black on Brown, 90 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2004).
 
121 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

122 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 152–53, 161 (1980)
(noting that judicial use of heightened scrutiny for suspect classifications is appropriate when democratic 
process has failed an unpopular minority).
123 
Nussbaum, supra note 120, at 30; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With
Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1992) (―Existing
distributions are treated as natural and exogenous to the legal system, and the normal role of government is
thus seen as the ratification and protection of these distributions, based in part on existing preferences.‖).
258
 
  
 
   
  
  
 
 
   
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
               
          
           
     
Vol. 5:2] Taylor Flynn
suggesting that objectors will be in the minority.
124 
Particularly given that some 
objectors will no doubt be members of religious minorities, a claim of minority status by
religious objectors has purchase, in part due to the unfortunate and widespread nature of 
religious discrimination.  All groups are free to employ competing claims to minority
status in their effort to create social change.  On the issue of same-sex marriage, however, 
such a claim would be counterfactual: religiously-based opposition to same-sex marriage
in the United States remains a view held by a majority of Americans.
125 
V. CONCLUSION
¶63 It is worthy of a reminder that the question is not whether, in their private lives, 
religious objectors are required to buy the same-sex couple next door a wedding gift; 
instead, those seeking to discriminate offer their services to the general public, in most 
instances for profit. While on their face, the proposals could permit widespread 
discrimination on a multitude of protected bases, they appear to have been crafted to 
seize on cultural and religious anxiety and fears concerning same-sex marriage; the likely
result, as-applied, would be to effectively eviscerate the hard-won sexual orientation 
protections in place, still in fewer than half of the states.  Well-meaning, religiously-
based intentions, moreover, do not palliate the harm.  Instead, the proposed exemptions 
would create a societal framework in which lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men can be
refused service in virtually all aspects of our lives, whether fundamental or mundane— 
from healthcare to housing, from employment to flower-buying—accomplished with the 
express permission of the state. 
124 
See supra note 23 for assertions by Stern, supra note 1, at 308, and Koppelman, supra note 21, at 132–
	
35, that the number of persons seeking exemptions is likely to be small. 

125 
See, e.g., supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (setting forth data to support the fact that majority
 
opposition to equal marriage is the nationwide norm).
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